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Introduction
Foreign policy making is often seen as an executive-dominated branch, making
parliaments rather peripheral actors (e.g. Born and Hänggi, 2004; Dieterich et
al., 2015). That is particularly the case when it comes to decision-making on
military interventions. Over the last two decades, however, landmark rulings
(1994 Federal Constitutional Court ruling in Germany), constitutional reforms
(Netherlands in 2000, France in 2008) and new legislation (2005 deployment
law in Germany, 2005 organic law on national defence in Spain) have provided
increased parliamentary involvement in decision-making on military deploy-
ments, sparking academic interest. In comparison to these changes, no serious
1 Yf Reykers is a PhD fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO). He conducts his research at
the Leuven International and European Studies (LINES) Institute at KU Leuven and is a former
visiting scholar at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. His research
focuses on decision-making within and between the United Nations Security Council and regional
organisations on military operations. [Corresponding author: yf.reykers@kuleuven.be]
2 Daan Fonck is a PhD fellow at the Leuven International and European Studies (LINES) Institute of
the University of Leuven. His research focuses on the foreign policy of the European Union, particu-
larly towards Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood. His doctoral research concentrates on the parlia-
mentary diplomacy of the European Parliament.
3 Both authors contributed equally to this study.
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attempts at revising the strong executive dominance in this field have taken
place in Belgium.
However, since 2011, practice seems to suggest a more prominent role for
the Belgian Federal Parliament. For the first time, the Belgian Parliament was
asked prior authorisation for the deployment of foreign military interventions to
Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014). But to what extent have these consultations also
resulted in more effective oversight or control on behalf of the Parliament?
Given that from a constitutional point of view the Parliament remains a very
marginal player in military interventions, one might wonder who is controlling
whom. Is the parliament drawing red lines towards the government? Or is the
government instrumentalising parliamentary backing for legitimising risky mili-
tary interventions abroad?
This article undertakes an in-depth analysis of the oversight capacity of the
Belgian Federal Parliament on military interventions, using the interventions
in Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014) as case studies. It does so by analysing the
Parliament’s oversight capacity in terms of its authority, ability and attitude to
hold a government accountable. Going beyond a mere legal approach, this
study builds on interviews with parliamentarians, as well as with governmen-
tal, diplomatic and military officials, next to the scrutiny of parliamentary
records and news media to draw up a complete picture of the legislative-execu-
tive dynamics that are at play when deploying military missions abroad.
A Framework for Analysis
Despite increased attention, academic literature on parliamentary control over
military interventions remains largely descriptive (Wagner, 2006: 8). Most
scholars limit themselves to discussing the pros and cons of increased parlia-
mentary control capacities, or to providing country-wide overviews of parlia-
mentary war powers (e.g. Peters and Wagner, 2011; Dieterich et al., 2015).
The wide variety of cross-case comparisons of parliamentary war powers in
European democracies has generated a useful panoramic overview. However,
such large-n studies inevitably only scrape the surface, trading in-depth analy-
sis for a broader picture. Analysis of parliamentary oversight in concrete deci-
sion-making processes still remains the exception.
Numerous authors already indicated the added value of in-depth case stud-
ies, yet they do not always fully practice what they preach (Hänggi, 2004;
Born and Hänggi, 2005; Dieterich et al., 2015: 100). Reiterating Kesgin and
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Kaarbo’s point (2010: 20) that studying the constitutional provisions of parlia-
mentary war powers is “only a starting point for research”, the analysis
presented below moves beyond a pure legal focus. Based upon insights from
Born and Hänggi (2005), it not only focuses on a parliament’s powers and
formal capacity, but equally includes the “willingness to hold the government
to account for its actions” (Ibid: 4).
The ‘Triple A’ Framework
This study applies the ‘triple A framework’ presented by Born and Hänggi
(2005), which includes the authority, ability and attitude of a parliament for
holding a government accountable in its decision to participate to military
interventions.
1. Authority not only encompasses the basic war power of prior authorisa-
tion, it also takes into account formal rights such as the approval of a
mission’s mandate and operational issues, the right to visit troops or to
decide on the duration of the operation. It may also be derived from
other basic parliamentary oversight tools such as the right to ask ques-
tions, the approval of the (military) budget, and so on.
2. Ability is defined in terms of the sufficiency of the resources parliamen-
tarians can rely upon. This includes the presence and strength of
specific parliamentary defence committees, the availability of a budget
and staff for such committees and the ability to use external expertise.
3. Attitude, which is most relevant for going beyond a purely legal focus,
has been described as “the political willingness of parliamentarians to
use the tools and mechanisms at their disposal” (Ibid: 11). According to
Born and Hänggi, this includes taking into account both outside pres-
sures by media and public opinion, as well as factors such as pressures
by the government, party discipline, and the attitude of individual
parliamentarians.
Our analysis of the Belgian Federal Parliament’s control capacity over partici-
pation in military interventions starts with a general overview of its authority
and ability to do so. Next, it turns to the attitude of the Parliament in two
concrete decision-making processes, being the troop deployments to Libya
(2011) and Iraq (2014-2015).
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The analysis builds on 12 semi-structured in-depth interviews with involved
Members of Parliament, the ministerial cabinets of Defence and Foreign
Affairs, and the military. It is also based on an extensive study of news media,
as well as parliamentary records.
The Belgian Federal Parliament and the Interventions in 
Libya and Iraq
Authority
What is the authority of the Belgian Federal Parliament to decide upon the
deployment of military troops abroad? Following Born and Hänggi (2005: 5),
“the strongest tool of parliamentary oversight by far is the constitutional or
legal right to approve or reject the use of force”. From this point of view, the
Belgian Parliament only has a very limited authority. Article 167 of the
Belgian Constitution states that: “The King commands the armed forces, and
determines the state of war and the cessation of hostilities”, putting the power of
authorisation entirely in the hands of the executive. It furthermore argues that
“He notifies the Chambers as soon as State interests and security permit and he
adds those messages deemed appropriate.”4 The Parliament is hence only to be
informed about troop deployments, and it is not even specified when and how
this notification needs to take place (Ruys, 2009: 514). Following from Born
and Hänggi’s classification, Belgium can therefore be categorised at the lower
end in the parliamentary war powers ‘league table’, together with Poland,
Portugal, or the UK. This contrasts sharply to the legislatures of Denmark or
Germany, which do have the power of prior authorisation and may influence
the details of deployment.
The implication is that within the actual decision-making process for
launching or prolonging military missions, the Belgian Parliament is formally at
best a peripheral actor.5 It is therefore obliged to seek recourse to conventional
legislative, budgetary, and oversight powers. Concerning legislative powers, the
Constitution provides no basis for a generic law on prior approval for the
4 Whereas the Belgian Constitution makes mentioning of the King, the actual responsibility is carried by
his Ministers (Art. 63), implying that all stipulations about his tasks, rights and duties are to be inter-
preted as those of the Government.
5 Within government the political power resides within the so-called ‘decision-making triangle’ of the
Minister of Defence, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Prime Minister, with the formalisation of
decisions occurring within the core cabinet and the final approval by the council of ministers (Minister-
raad) (Moyse and Dumoulin, 2011).
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deployment of forces of the kind Germany or Spain have. The ‘power of the
purse’ (the annual approval of the federal government budget) also turns out to
be a blunt tool, since approval is given for the totality of the budget, without a
detailed discussion or breakdown for military operations (Houben, 2005: 44).
Similarly, for the annual revision of the budget, no discussion takes place
within the defence committee for the military specifics, as the finance commit-
tee deals with it is as part of the whole budget (Interview #10). What remains
are the general scrutiny and oversight powers such as the right to interpellate
the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Defence, to put him or her before a motion
of confidence, to ask oral or written questions, to hold (emergency) debates, to
organise hearings, and to install an investigative committee (for an elaborate
overview and analysis of these instruments, see Velaers, 2005). The impact of
these levers depends on the ability (the resources) and attitude (political will-
ingness) of parliamentarians to effectively make use of them, factors which are
discussed in the next two sections.
Ability
One can ask whether the near-total lack of constitutional powers is reflected in
the Belgian Parliament’s ability to control military operations. Given the lack
of direct constitutional prerogatives with regard to military interventions, the
Parliament primarily makes use of its general control and oversight powers as
listed above. For doing so, it has three parliamentary committees at its
disposal: the Defence Committee (DC), the Foreign Affairs Committee
(FAC)6, and the Special Committee for the Monitoring of Foreign Missions
(SCMFM). The latter was initially set up in the Senate, following the recom-
mendations of the Rwanda investigative committee (1997)7, but nowadays
continues to exist within the Chamber. The membership of all three committees
reflects the allocation of seats in the general Chamber; the DC and the FAC
consist of 17 MPs and the SCMFM of 13 MPs.
While the DC and the FAC have interpellation rights and the right to ask
questions to the minister in charge, this is not the case for the SCMFM, as
this committee deals with the technical details of the actual operations. There-
fore the SCMFM takes place behind closed doors and its members are bound
6 The DC and FAC can convene in a joint session when deemed relevant.
7 This investigative committee was set up after the murder of ten Belgian soldiers that were partaking in
the UNAMIR peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (1994).
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to strict confidentiality. According to its internal rules8, the SCMFM is
provided with the conclusions of the council of ministers, the Rules of Engage-
ment (RoE) of the military operation (including the Belgian caveats with
regard to the mission), and the reports of the military intelligence service. Put
differently, the oversight capacity of the SCMFM is largely determined by the
information it receives from the executive and the military.
The institutional resources committee members can draw upon are rather
weak as well (De Winter, 1998: 105). In sharp contrast to the situation in
neighbouring countries9, each of these committees has only one parliamentary
officer at its disposal, solely tasked with administrative and procedural func-
tions. Nor are the relevant committees awarded a separate budget to organise
events or to order studies. There is no research or policy analysis unit present
that can provide briefings to parliamentarians, instead there is only a library
with a small collection of books. The only relevant source of information is the
Court of Audit, a collateral institution of the Parliament, charged with provid-
ing external scrutiny on the budget and spending.10 These findings are therefore
in line with those of De Winter and Wolfs (forthcoming) who argue that due to
a partitocratic decision-making culture, valuable expertise and resources reside
within the political parties rather than within Parliament.
Interestingly, however, a near-total absence of authority and limited degrees
of parliamentary ability to control the executive do not necessarily imply that
the Belgian Parliament is doomed to be a powerless spectator. Much can
depend upon the attitude of its members, as well as upon the context of a
specific crisis.
Attitude
To analyse the attitude of the Belgian Federal Parliament in concrete decision-
making processes, two military interventions have been selected: the Libya inter-
vention of 2011 and the Iraq intervention of 2014-2015. The analysis will focus
on two phases within each of the decision-making processes: the discussions and
decision on the participation, and the follow-up during the actual operations.
8 Commissie Opvolging Buitenlandse Missies, huishoudelijk reglement, aangenomen op 7 oktober 2014.
9 Staff of the Defence committees: Netherlands (5), Germany (8), France (11) (Born & Hänngi 2005:
10).
10 With regard to the evaluation of military missions, a single study conducted in 2010 on ‘learning from
foreign military operations’ is useful and informative, but maintains a narrow focus on ‘efficiency’ and
the capacity for ‘lessons learned’ within de defence department (see Rekenhof, 2010).
stud.diplom.2015-2.book  Page 96  Friday, June 3, 2016  10:48 AM
97
S TUDI A D IP LO MAT ICA 2015 •  LXVIII-2
WHO IS CONTROLLING WHOM?
The following sections inquire whether the Belgian Parliament purely acted
within the formal boundaries given to (or imposed upon) it, remaining a
rubber-stamping institution, or whether it actively tried to control the executive
by stretching these boundaries to their limits or even moving around them.
First, some general circumstances are highlighted which seem to have gener-
ated a window of opportunity for more parliamentary oversight. Subsequently,
it is asked how the attitude of the Parliament determined the degree to which
such increased oversight could indeed materialise.
Libya and Iraq: general observations
On 17 March 2011, reacting against Colonel Qaddafi’s violent suppression of
protests in Libya, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973, authorising the use of
“all necessary measures” to protect civilians under threat of attack (Operative
Paragraph 4), the enforcement of a no-fly zone over the Libyan territory
(Operative Paragraph 6) and the instalment of an arms embargo (Operative
Paragraph 13). While the intervention was initially implemented by a coalition
of the willing, NATO took over command and control on 31 March, establish-
ing Operation Unified Protector. Belgian military forces participated in the
operation from 21 March with six F16 fighter jets, a marine minesweeper and
approximately 200 military support personnel. The entire operation, including
the Belgian contribution, was brought to an end on 31 October 2011.
On 7 August 2014, USA President Barack Obama announced his approval
for a military intervention over Iraq11, a direct reaction against atrocities
committed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the threat
against Yazidi minorities. On 10 September, he announced an expansion of the
strikes to Syria. Despite lacking explicit UNSC authorisation12, the US inter-
vention quickly turned into an international coalition of the willing. Belgian air
force deployed six F-16 fighter jets and an additional 120 military troops for
support reasons (limited to the territory of Iraq). The Belgian participation
started on 26 September 2014 and was ‘paused’ on 30 June 2015.13
11 Statement by the President, The White House (Office of the Press Secretary) (07.08.2014) (retrieved
from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-president)
12 Contrary to the case of Syria, there was however a demand from the government in Baghdad for foreign
military support in the fight against ISIL.
13 The air campaign meanwhile was been taken over by the Netherlands. Both countries agreed that
Belgium would take over again from the Netherlands in the summer of 2016. In the meantime, around
30 trainers were still present on the ground.
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Both cases indicate the importance of the concrete decision-making contexts
as practice twice deviated from the formal authorisation rules outlined above.
As the Belgian government was in dismissal and reduced to a caretaker role at
the time of the Libya crisis, the executive prerogative was put into question by
constitutional experts (e.g. Interview #8; De Standaard, 22/03/2011, p.40). It
resulted in a cross-party consensus that the government could only act on the
basis of a parliamentary resolution giving prior authorisation for Belgian
participation. Quite similarly, the decision for an Iraq intervention coincided
with the last week of the 2014 government formation and was therefore also
first brought to the Parliament for approval. While the participation in the
Libya intervention was approved with unanimity (minus one) on 21 March
2011, the approval for deployment to Iraq on 26 September 2014 was less
broadly supported, as the extreme-left parties PVDA-PTB voted against and
the green fraction Ecolo-Groen! abstained.
Each of the two cases hence appear to have provided the Belgian Federal
Parliament with a unique opportunity to play a larger role than it is constitu-
tionally allowed to. This was recognised by the involved parliamentarians,
particularly concerning the Libya crisis. According to a key liberal Member of
Parliament, “we quickly had a sense that it was possible, that parliament could
play a role” (Interview #11). This was particularly due to the existing deadlock
in the government formation, which caused “a situation where there was no real
majority or opposition, no pre-defined role-playing within the Parliament” (Ibid).
Put differently, the oversight capacity of the Parliament was much more
dependent upon the willingness of the parliamentarians than it had been in
previous cases. In addition, both parliamentary resolutions explicitly stressed
the request to discuss any change of mandate with the Chamber and keep it
permanently involved (Doc 53 1308/001, p.4; Doc 54 0305/004, p.4). Interest-
ingly, the observation that the government again consulted the Parliament three
years later during the Iraq crisis even led to a parliamentary belief that hereby
“a good practice has been initiated” (Interview #9).
While the above suggests that a window of opportunity for greater oversight
and an awareness of it were present in both cases, this does not necessarily
mean that the Parliament also effectively made use of it. Analysis should take
into account three aspects which determine its attitude or willingness (thus
capacity) to do so: the importance of outside pressures in approving deploy-
ment, the information asymmetries hindering concrete follow-up of the inter-
ventions, and the degree of party discipline.
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Parliamentary approval and outside pressures
Born and Hänggi (2005: 11) have argued that the willingness to accept the use
of force is often largely determined by “outside pressures such as the demand by
public opinion and the media ‘to do something’ when civil wars occur”. This is a
largely uncontested argument (e.g. Rosenau, 1961; Rosenau, 1967; Hildebrandt
et al., 2013) which is also clearly illustrated by both of our cases.
Despite a long debate in the Joint Committee on Defence and Foreign
Affairs on 18 March 2011, the deployment of Belgian military forces to Libya
was authorised with quasi-unanimity in the Federal Parliament. In addition to
stressing the necessity to follow the 1997 Rwanda investigative committee’s
recommendations on clear and straightforward Rules of Engagement, nearly all
speakers within the Joint Committee expressed their abhorrence for Qaddafi’s
violent attacks against protestors and their support for immediate action
(CRIV 53 Com 162). Additionally, during interviews both parliamentarians
and members of the cabinet of Foreign Affairs stressed that the media’s pres-
sure to take action could not be neglected.
The outside pressures surrounding the Libya conflict seem to have created
an over-enthusiast climate within Parliament. This atmosphere not only deter-
mined the strong parliamentary support during the actual vote, but may also
have indirectly impeded its capacity to critically scrutinise the executive. One
crucial observation which supports this argument is that, in contrast to UNSC
Resolution 1973 (which only mandated the use of all necessary means to protect
civilians), the Belgian Members of Parliament did not oppose the majority
drafted14 parliamentary resolution’s statement that “conditions are fulfilled for a
military action against the regime of Qaddafi” (Doc 53 1308/001, para 2).15 In
other words, it implicitly accepted the goal of regime change, which was later
internationally contested. According to some, this voluntarist and controversial
paragraph should be understood in the context of a parliamentary battle against
that time’s government (Interview #11), whose decision to support Libya’s
candidacy for a seat in the UN Human Rights Council in 2010 was heavily
14 This resolution was proposed by the Christian democrats and drafted by government officials. Note that
both the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, and the Foreign Affairs Minister belonged to the
same Christian Democratic party (CD&V).
15 The wording is all the more surprising since Prime Minister Leterme reassured the Parliament at the
same time that ‘the goal of our action is not the removal of the Qaddafi regime, but the protection of the
Libyan people’. However, at the same time his party was already urging the EU to prepare for the post-
Qaddafi era (De Standaard, 22/03/2011, p.6; De Morgen, 22/03/2011, p.4). Similarly, Minister of
Defence De Crem reassured the DC-FAC committee ‘regime change is not what is aimed for’ (De
Morgen, 19/03/2011, p.5)
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criticised. Members of the executive noted that this “atmosphere creation” made
the Parliament particularly supportive (and thus uncritical) to any kind of
international reaction against the Libyan regime (Interview #2), to the extent
that this even might have hindered its capacity to curb the executive (Interview
#4).
Although the government’s decision to request parliamentary approval
created a window of opportunity for parliamentary oversight, it seems that this
did not lead to a limitation of the executive’s degrees of freedom in participat-
ing in the Libya operation. Furthermore, even before the Parliament was able
to approve the military operation, Belgian fighter jets had already entered
Libyan airspace for their first flights (De Standaard, 22/03/2011, p.1).
Regarding outside pressures, a largely similar observation can be made for
the Iraq deployment (Interview #1; #12). Yet, this authorisation was more
prone to debate given the absence of a UNSC mandate. Quite similarly to the
Libya situation, the many videos spread by ISIL of beheadings and other
atrocities, and the imminent threat that was posed against the Yazidi popula-
tion, caused international outrage and a sense of urgency among policy-makers.
The terrorist attack of an ISIL fighter four months earlier in Brussels (killing
four) and the highly salient debate on the number of Belgian ‘foreign fighters’
that joined ranks with ISIL further added to this feeling. This made politicians
of all parties but the Greens (who abstained) and the extreme-left (voting
against) closing ranks to support the military intervention. A liberal MP even
argued that ‘not participating to the military coalition in Iraq would imply
complicity in crimes against humanity’ (CRIV 54 PLEN 005).
However, whereas lack of clear majority-opposition dynamics during the
Libyan crisis still gave the Parliament a genuine say, this was much less the
case for the parliamentary consultation for the Iraq intervention. A new
government was ready to take office within a week, making that the future
majoritarian MPs were already put under heavy constraint of their party lead-
ers, the level at which a deal was struck. Indeed, notwithstanding the lively
debate, the entire text of the resolution – again written by the executive16 –
was already approved at all party headquarters of the new majority, including
the then still main opposition party (N-VA), before the debate was even initi-
ated within the Joint Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs (Interview
16 The resolution was drafted by cabinet aids of the Ministers of Defence (De Crem) and Foreign Affairs
(Reynders), and its content was negotiated with party leaders of both the old and the new majority
(Interview #12).
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#12; cf. also De Standaard, 25/09/2014, p.20). The (new) opposition MPs also
lamented the fact the Belgian F16 fighter jets were already on their way to
their first stop at the Araxos airbase in Greece before the vote in Parliament
was held. Finally, in absence of a NATO-umbrella, no pre-defined Rules of
Engagement were in place for the military intervention, leading to Parliament
approving a mission without any knowledge on the Rules of Engagement (De
Standaard, 30/09/2014, p.6). Taking into account that during the parliamen-
tary discussions of 18 March numerous MPs highlighted the Rwanda investi-
gative committee’s recommendations on clear Rules of Engagement, this lack of
clarity is somewhat surprising.17
Follow-up and information-gathering
In terms of information gathering and expertise provision, both of our cases
indicate a clear information asymmetry at the expense of parliamentarians,
impeding their capacity to effectively monitor or influence the interventions.
We first turn to the formal information channels at the disposal of parliamen-
tarians that are provided by the relevant committees (the DC, the FAC, and
the SCMFM), after which we analyse the dynamics of informal information
streams.
Analysis of discussions within the DC and the FAC shows a general
parliamentary frustration with the extent of the information they received from
government during the interventions, some even making the accusation that
“the Minister retains valuable information from parliament” (CRIV 53 COM
182). It is said that the information which is given in both committees is “not
of such a quality which allows for making credible estimations of what happens on
the ground” (Interview #7). However, one should take into account that a clear
division of tasks exists between the DC and FAC which deals with political
aspects of military missions, and the SCMFM which deals with technical (and
often highly sensitive) military matters of the intervention (Interview #10). On
the one hand, the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers’ frequent referral to
discussions in the SCMFM in answering parliamentary questions could be
understood in that regard. On the other, opposition MPs claim that this divi-
sion of labour between committees makes it easy for the minister “not to touch
17 Although the Rwanda investigative committee's recommendations addressed Belgian participation in UN
peace operations, these hence also seem to have gained foothold amongst MPs when it comes to author-
izing military interventions in so-called ad-hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’.
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the hot potato” by referring difficult questions back and forth to other commit-
tees (Interviews #7 and #9).
Within the SCMFM, several factors hinder parliamentarians’ control
capacity, even if the willingness to do so might be present. As indicated earlier,
three specific types of information are provided to this committee: the conclu-
sions of the council of ministers, the RoE of the military operation, and the
reports of the military intelligence service. First, complaints about the type of
information are present, as indicated in numerous interviews. During an opera-
tion, the Minister of Defence (sided by his or her cabinet and assisted by mili-
tary experts), gives a presentation about the state of play of the operation. MPs
are allowed to bring one assistant, but may not take notes. Whereas on the one
hand some MPs argue that not enough information is provided, others indicate
that presentations often take the form of “beating the parliamentarians to death
with technical military jargon” (Interview #7). More generally, and following
Houben (2005: 43-46), there seems to be no way to verify whether the infor-
mation given is accurate, complete and truthful.
Second, being informed about the RoE – a practice which only started with
the Belgian participation in Afghanistan – in reality means that parliamentari-
ans can only look into the RoE, without actually affecting them (Interview
#8).18 Granted, even within a broad international coalition such as the NATO
framework in the Libya intervention, each country can specify its own caveats,
which might create an opportunity for parliamentarians.19 While it was indi-
cated by some members that “here our voice is being heard” (Interview #9),
concrete evidence of actual influence remains absent.
Third, contrary to many other countries, there is no standardised process
for the political evaluation or follow up of military missions (Houben, 2005:
43). Very sporadically, the Minister of Defence invites MPs for a visit to the
troops or an airbase, as happened in the case of Libya. Regarding the prolon-
gation of missions, the Parliament remains completely side-lined. For example,
after the initial parliamentary approval for a military intervention in Iraq for
the duration of one month, the subsequent extensions were decided unilaterally
by the council of ministers, without a prior debate within Parliament (although
it explicitly asked for that).
18 That should however not be surprising, as the specification of RoE are primarily a military responsi-
bility, and are often already pre-defined by the alliance’s broader framework (such as the NATO RoE
in the Libya intervention).
19 Belgium for instance not just copied the NATO RoE, but added that force could only be used if neces-
sary to protect civilians (Interview #2).
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Finally, and most crucially, the SCMFM’s practice is bound to strict confi-
dentiality. In other words, all information provided by the executive or military
should be kept strictly behind the closed doors of the SCMFM by each of its
13 members. While military information is sensitive, complaints have been
expressed in both cases about the government’s urge for confidentiality on
issues which were publicly shared in other countries. In addition, the obliga-
tion of strict confidentiality provides the executive with an opportunity to stra-
tegically share information in the SCMFM. This means that the executive can
a priori limit the Parliament’s capacity to effectively control it as the broader
dissemination of this information is prohibited.
Next to these formal communication channels, parliamentarians can draw
upon informal channels. Both of our cases for instance show evidence of some
limited consultations from the cabinet level with parliamentarians in order to
secure the necessary support before the issue is brought to a vote. This allowed
MPs to acquire information and to raise concerns or reservations towards the
draft resolution.
Parliamentarians also highlighted a number of informal information streams
they rely upon once an issue was put on the parliamentary agenda. These
include party networks (i.e. a parliamentarian’s personal assistant, experts
within the party, study departments, former ministers within the party, party
affiliates in the executive departments, MEPs and information exchange with
European counterparts), but also less partisan networks (academia, NGOs or
think tanks). The importance of these informal networks was highlighted by
one member of the SCMFM, stating that “we are often better informed through
the information we get from our Dutch counterparts, than through the information
we receive from our government”20 (Interview #8).
Yet, the degree of information asymmetry also strongly varies among MPs,
along three axes. First, while majoritarian MPs have direct access to govern-
mental contacts through their party’s Vice-Prime Minister21 in the government
(and in that way are kept fully informed about all preparations and activities
when decisions are still in the pipeline), opposition MPs are kept out of the
loop during this crucial stage. Second, the informal party networks of the tradi-
20 For each participation to an international military intervention, the Dutch government has to provide a
detailed letter (the ‘article 100 letter’) to the Staten-Generaal in which it informs the MPs about the
political and military context of the situation at hand, and puts forward its motivation for participating
to an intervention.
21 Each coalition party has one vice-PM in the government, allowing to jointly follow and discuss initia-
tives of other ministers in the government.
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tional ‘regime parties’ (socialist, liberals, and Christian democrats) within the
Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs are determinative as well, as these
are much bigger and older than those of younger or anti-establishment parties
(Interviews #9 and #10). Thirdly, the rank or position of an MP can make a
difference, as “the higher your position within politics, the easier you can get in
touch with experts on an ad hoc basis” (Interview #11).
Government pressure and party discipline
Belgium is a classic example of a ‘partitocratic system’ where the gravity point
of political power lies within the party headquarters, rather than within
government as such. The effect thereof is that Belgian MPs are much more
agents of their party than of their electorate (cf. Dewachter, 2003; De Winter,
1998). Since MPs’ (voting) behaviour in committees is strongly instructed and
monitored by the party, voting cohesion is very strong and majority MPs
loyally follow their ‘allies’ in government (De Winter, 1998). Given the strong
constitutional executive dominance, party discipline and government pressure
are manifestly at play with regard to decisions on military interventions
(Houben 2005: 41-46; Moyse & Dumoulin, 2011: 18-20, 23), to the extent that
the government (through the parties) appears to be more in control of Parlia-
ment than vice versa. Four observations support this claim.
First, as we already mentioned before, it is somehow surprising to find that
both parliamentary resolutions, although introduced via an MP, were in fact
written by government executives and pre-discussed (even pre-agreed) by the
political parties’ leadership before they were introduced within the Chamber.
An MP in that regard indicated that, once the resolution is put to vote, “you
may get a telephone call from the party president, who wants to be sure you are
going to vote in the right way” (Interview #7). In principle, parliamentary reso-
lutions contain recommendations or questions from the Parliament to the
government. While these might not be directly enforceable; their adoption by a
majority of parliamentarians is supposed to encompass a considerable extent of
political authority. However, by relocating the actual authorship of these
‘parliamentary demands’ back to government circles, this oversight instrument
risks becoming perverted, or is very cynically interpreted at least.
Second, it is clear that the government does not feel compelled to act
strictly within the lines of the resolution. Put differently, the government
does not estimate that non-compliance forms a potential risk for a motion of
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censure.22 In both the Libya and Iraq case, the resolution contained a
sentence which explicitly asked to “guarantee the continued involvement of the
Chamber and to renegotiate when circumstances would change the length, the
nature and the territory of the Belgian deployment” (see DOC 53 1308/001,
p.4; DOC 54 0305/004, p.4). Both in May and October 2011, however, the
duration of the Belgian deployment to Libya was extended without prior
discussion in Parliament. During debates within the DC, numerous MPs
expressed serious critiques to the executive for side-lining Parliament, with
some even stressing the risk of “ultimately leading to mission creep”. Remark-
ably, the mandate’s extension was explained as an “emergency measure”
(May 2011) and “a continuation of the mission mandated by the North-Atlan-
tic Council” (October 2011), hence arguing not having violated the parlia-
mentary resolution (CRIV 53 COM 225; CRIV 53 COM 316).
Third, this raises the question on the executive’s main reason for a priori
asking parliamentary authorisation in both cases. While some members of the
executive during the Libya crisis indicated their support for increased parlia-
mentary oversight capacities (Interview #1), it seems that in both cases the
members of the caretaker government particularly wanted to guarantee suffi-
cient backing in case something would go wrong. Besides a literal referral to
this logic by the then Foreign Affairs Minister during the above mentioned
Joint Meeting on Libya, he furthermore argued that this involves that “we can
take every decision in this regard with the guarantee that in Belgium both the
executive and the assembly (…) accept such a decision with greatest lucidity”
(CRIV 53, Com 162). Rather than getting constrained by Parliament, the
government thus seems to have instrumentalised parliamentary resolutions to
convey themselves a stronger degree of legitimacy and to diffuse political
responsibility.
Finally, the executive culture in Belgian foreign policy decision-making is
not one of favouring strong exposure to Parliament and public opinion. For
example, one interviewee argued that “within the Foreign Affairs Department, a
fear is present for being made overly dependent upon a vote in Parliament”
(Interview #7). With regard to the Libyan intervention, the Minister of
Defence stated that “the execution and completion of the mission is a decision
22 A single motion of censure solely against the Minister of Defence is not even possible, since the deci-
sions on military intervention are taken by the whole of government. What remains left then, is the
‘nuclear option’ of sending home the entire government, a blunt decision that comes at a high cost for
parliamentarians themselves, and therefore highly unlikely (Houben 2005: 43).
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made by the government, with only a posteriori control by Parliament.” While
recognising that some kind of parliamentary monitoring has advantages, he
equally stressed that “this should not lead to a situation where the government or
the commanders on the field cannot take their responsibility in executive decisions”
(CRIV 53, Com 162). In the Iraq case, it was argued by Defence and Foreign
Affairs officials that once the government had full authority23, it was not
anymore bound to guaranteeing parliamentary approval. While the Libya and
Iraq case were definitely exceptional as both deployment decisions had to be
taken by a caretaker government, such a general executive logic seems plausi-
ble. Not only are there reasons to fear a delaying effect of such approval prac-
tices, it might also jeopardise a country’s reputation within multilateral
contexts such as in NATO and the EU. Besides, one could also argue that the
impact of the military on the Defence cabinet might differ from government to
government, and could equally impact the extent to which it feels an obligation
to inform the legislative branch.
Relatedly, as became clear throughout our interviews, similar political-ideo-
logical and strategic convictions could be detected within parties’ individual
reasoning. Depending upon the party affiliation, ideas differed about the degree
to which international crises should be dealt with in either a ‘pragmatic’ or a
more ‘principled’ way, including the degree to which Parliament should have a
say in it. These largely followed a conservative (Christian Democrats, Franco-
phone liberals, Flemish nationalists) versus progressive (Greens, socialists and
Flemish liberals) ideology. This latter group turns out to be more favourable
towards an increased parliamentary say and has proposed constitutional
amendments in that direction, thus far without result.
Conclusion
What this study makes clear is that the evaluation of the Belgian Parliament
through the triple A model of Born and Hänggi does not yield it a “triple A
rating”. Granted, the Parliament does not have an easy starting position: it
does not have the constitutional rights to be consulted for the approval or
prolongation of a military mission, neither can it build on a vast amount of
institutional resources.
23 The ‘Michel’ government was sworn in on 11 October 2014, about three weeks after the decision to
deploy troops to Iraq.
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Given these strong structural limitations, the prior consultations for the
Libyan and Iraq intervention could be seen as highly exceptional and unique
opportunities at first glance, being dependent on parliamentarians’ attitude to
stretch boundaries to their limit. Especially the Libya case provided a strong
opportunity for Parliament to play a bigger role, given the lack of a govern-
ment with an easy-to-discipline parliamentary majority at its disposal.
Yet, although the government formally consulted the Parliament in both
cases, it appears that the debates held were to a large extent cosmetic. The
attitude or willingness of the Parliament is strongly paralysed by party disci-
pline and partitocratic decision-making, making Members of Parliament agents
of their party instead of their own electorate. In such context, accountability
mechanisms such as interpellations, or even genuine parliamentary reflection,
debate and approval, cannot fully generate governmental scrutiny. If the
government holds the pen of parliamentary resolutions, and when fighter jets
take off before their approval, what remains of their significance? Given this
strong party discipline, one could even wonder to what extent a constitutional
amendment might be able to improve the effective oversight capacity of the
Parliament.
This brings us to a final point: of crucial importance to comprehend the role
played by Parliament is to take into account the preferences of the executive.
Dynamics in both cases seem to have been characterised by the governments’
caretaker status, and thus a lack of full legitimacy (added to that the lack of a
UN mandate in the case of Iraq) to act cavalier seul. While intuitively, one
would expect the executive’s decision to consult Parliament being dependent
upon the risk Belgian troops will be confronted with during an operation, the
above analysis draws a different picture as the degree of freedom of Parliament
(thus reduced party discipline) seems to be a function of the strength of major-
ity-opposition dynamics. Indeed, as we have indicated, once the government
could act on full powers again, the initial parliamentary actorness was nipped
in the bud. This is an observation which does not only deserve further analy-
sis, but might equally affect debates on the parliamentary desire to gain
increased formal powers.
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